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The Pentagon is planning to gradually increase the Navy's Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) 
force over the next several years to meet increasing global demands.  The move was 
authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in a program decision 
memorandum (PDM) in December 2002.  The PDM, which directed the growth of 
Special Operations Forces across the board, called on the Navy to bring the equivalent of 
two new SEAL Teams to the force between FY-06 and FY-08.  Even though funding has 
been allotted to this task, there may not be enough manpower to fill these slots.  Training 
issues coupled with retention issues have brought the growth process to a standstill. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify which major variables and/or 
combinations of small variables need to be changed in order to increase Naval Special 
Warfare (NSW) enlisted SEAL manning.  The three major areas that will be looked at are 
recruitment, training, and retention.  The focus will be to determine where NSW can do 
better at managing personnel in these areas.  The end product will be a detailed analysis 
that will offer suggestions for program changes that can be implemented to increase 
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To satisfy the requirement for increased SEAL manning, the NSW community 
must examine the current options available in order to influence NSW recruiting and 
retention variables.  The objective for increasing the enlisted SEAL inventory should 
include realistic methods to alter each independent variable and therefore create a large 
cumulative change by combining small incremental changes over time.   
NSW must strive for better qualified personnel for the initial Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) pipeline training in order to raise the percentage of 
graduating candidates who become SEALs. This can be done through more active 
recruiting and marketing outside of the Navy, as well as through a more selective BUD/S 
candidate screening process. This strategy would give NSW a look at the prospective 
recruits while, at the same time, providing the recruits a preview of NSW to determine if 
they “fit” into the type of work environment associated with the SEAL Teams.  The key 
idea is that quality BUD/S graduates come from quality BUD/S recruits.  Our proposals 
would incrementally increase the SEAL manning inventory.  Another retention option 
may be to prolong the average NSW enlisted SEAL’s career through various means. 
Certain pays and benefits should be raised to help create an incentive for all categories of 
SEAL operators to remain in the NSW community.  There are numerous incentive 
options being explored at the SOCOM and NSW level, but our emphasis is primarily 
focused on specialty pays and retirement.  Yet another variable which may need to be 
addressed is the current NSW deployment strategy.  Although there are required political 
and alliance-building concerns even during a time of war, there is a valid rationale to 
reduce, or even eliminate joint combined exercises from the current NSW global agenda.  
A changed deployment strategy may lead to better retention and other long term benefits.   
Increasing the enlisted SEAL inventory will take some time to implement.  
However, NSW needs to make an early change to the existing force structure that is 
significant enough to carry out current war time requirements and sustain them during 
peacetime in the future.  Additionally, NSW needs consistent benefits and long-term 



























To satisfy the requirement for increased SEAL manning, the NSW community 
must examine the options available in order to influence the recruiting and retention 
variables outlined in our thesis.  It appears that any one variable in of itself, while 
ignoring other variables, is insufficient to exact total successful change which the NSW 
community desires.  The NSW objective for increasing the enlisted SEAL inventory 
should include realistic methods to alter each independent variable and therefore create a 
large cumulative change by combining small incremental changes over time.  Some 
suggestions for NSW leaders are listed in the following paragraphs. 
NSW must strive for better qualified personnel for the initial Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) pipeline training in order to raise the percentage of 
graduating candidates who become SEALs.  This can be done through more active 
recruiting and marketing outside of the Navy.  A recruiting emphasis on college level 
students and athletes would help provide more quality recruits than only an emphasis on 
recruiting high school students.  Recruiters should, ideally, engage a larger audience to 
attract more qualified recruits and only send those that are “pre-qualified” to BUD/S.  
Additionally, recruiters should be held accountable for recruited personnel that desire to 
become SEALs; to include a “recruiter reward incentive” for personnel that make it 
through the SEAL training pipeline.  This process could be started with a “Mini-BUD/S” 
type of program for prospective enlisted BUD/S candidates. This strategy would give 
NSW a look at the prospective recruits while, at the same time, providing the recruits a 
preview of NSW to determine if they “fit” into the type of work environment associated 
with the SEAL Teams.  Additionally, highly qualified potential recruits could be 
extended an opportunity to get out of their enlisted service obligation were they not to 
make it through BUD/S.  This would lower the cost/benefit ratio for highly qualified 
recruits that may, otherwise, decide not to take the risk of failing out of BUD/S and 
subsequently serving in the Navy Fleet for the remainder of their respective enlistments. 
Future NSW funding has already been requested to build up the BUD/S pipeline 
with more instructors and facilities in order to push more recruits through the SEAL 
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training pipeline.  However, the strategy of simply increasing the number of BUD/S 
candidates is not going to solve the NSW enlisted SEAL manning dilemma.  We believe 
that a better screening process should be implemented to attract a higher caliber or “more 
qualified” individual into the existing pipeline without significantly increasing the 
number of new candidates checking into BUD/S.  The number of graduating BUD/S 
candidates can, and should, be increased by improving the quality of the input, not 
necessarily by increasing the number of the input.  The historic graduation rate of 25% 
isn’t an NSW requirement in order to retain the quality of SEALs that the community 
desires.  The 25% GR is simply a historic trend at BUD/S; it can be changed without 
watering down the training curriculum.  The key idea in Chapter 2 is that quality 
graduates come from quality recruits.  This proposal would increase SEAL manning 
inventory as well as retention.  Arguably, higher quality recruits will ultimately evolve 
into higher quality SEALs who will have a positive impact on the type of personnel who 
might, otherwise, not stay in the community.  Ultimately, a higher quality input to the 
NSW community would increase retention in addition to improving the manning level. 
Another retention option may be to prolong the average NSW enlisted SEAL’s 
career through improved pay and benefits.  With the exception of FY02 (the post 9/11 
figures), there is a historical retirement rate of approximately 60% for category E enlisted 
SEALs.  In other words, 60% of the SEALs with over twenty years experience (category 
E) are lost every year (Appendix A).  Especially during a time of war, there should be a 
focus on reducing the resignation and retirement rate among the older and more 
experienced SEAL.  These experienced operators are critical to helping expand the force 
through critical instruction and mentorship.  Pay and benefits must be raised to help 
create an incentive for this category of SEAL operators to remain in the NSW 
community.  There are numerous incentive options being explored at the SOCOM and 
NSW level, but 100% retirement benefits for an operator who stays in the NSW 
community for 30 years may prove to be a worthwhile proposal.  Correspondingly, 
although long term retirement improvements may help with the category E SEALs, they 
may not prove an adequate vehicle for keeping the category A, B, C, and D SEALs in the 
Navy.   
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In that regard, retirement changes may be the long-term retention solution, but 
adjusting pay and benefits may be the short-term answer.  The pay and benefit problem 
needs to be addressed in light of the more immediate problem of losing less experienced 
SEALs to the world of civilian contracting companies, such as DynCorp and Blackwater.  
The enlisted SEAL’s paycheck must become competitive with outside employment 
opportunities.  The hard truth is that there are companies willing to pay enlisted SEALs 
six times their military salary.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the specialty pay for enlisted 
SEALs should be adjusted to the corresponding levels relative to the cost of living index 
of the late 1960s.  Simply put, SEAL specialty pay has not kept pace with the significant 
increases in the cost of living over the last three decades. 
Yet another variable which may need to be addressed is the current NSW 
deployment strategy.  An examination of how all enlisted SEALs are being employed 
around the globe during the WOT shows that many deployed SEALs are conducting joint 
and combined exercises for training (JCETs).  During this time of war, there appears to 
be an argument that “If a SEAL is not directly involved in the WOT mission, then he 
shouldn’t be deployed.”  Although there are required political and alliance-building 
concerns even during a time of war, there is a valid rationale to reduce, or even eliminate, 
JCETS from the current NSW global agenda.  A solution may lie in the suggestion of 
putting most of the politically insensitive JCETs on hold indefinitely.  Joint and 
combined evolutions are taking place every day in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In this time of 
critical manning, NSW must look at every operator and examine how he is being utilized, 
or under-utilized as the case may be.  By studying the true SEAL “job requirements” for 
this war, NSW may need to re-think what its core competencies should be in order to fit 
the current environment and threat.  A changed deployment strategy may lead to better 
retention and other long term benefits.   
Increasing the enlisted SEAL inventory will take some time to implement.  
However, NSW needs to make an early change to the existing force structure that is 
significant enough to carry out current war time requirements and sustain them during 
peacetime in the future.  Increasing manpower in response to imminent threats, while 
decreasing manpower for diminishing threats, seems to be a historic trend throughout the 
US military.  In order to avoid cyclical retention and manning levels, NSW should adapt 
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a strategy to sustain an adequate SEAL enlisted force.  NSW needs consistent benefits 
and long-term monetary compensation in order to retain the enlisted SEAL for the long 
run.  In order to implement plans as described above, increased DOD funding will have 
to be allocated to NSW.  
Until recently, members of the enlisted community have not been surveyed as to 
why they were getting out.  This is just one example of human resource and 
administration issues that should be addressed by the NSW community.  A new survey 
has been constructed to try and focus on why these crucial NSW members have not 
stayed in the Navy, but it will take time to get an accurate sampling and compile all the 
raw data.  As of this writing, the data is not yet available, but the survey has been 
completed.  In that regard, the views expressed in this writing are those of the authors and 
not based on findings in other NSW surveys and/or studies. 
In the remaining chapters, we will concentrate on different actions that can be 
taken to help resolve the NSW problem of an enlisted SEAL manning shortfall and a less 
than desirable enlisted SEAL retention rate.  We have based the first model on historical 
BUD/S graduate data and will demonstrate a recommended strategy to utilize an 
optimum number of graduates by either increasing the quality of input or increasing the 
quantity of input to the system.  The second model is based on historic Navy enlisted 
SEAL retention data and will help lay the groundwork for a possible retention policy 
which differs from the current approach being utilized by NSW leadership. 
The primary focus of the thesis is to demonstrate how NSW may be able to 
achieve the goal of increasing the NSW enlisted SEAL force by approximately 200 






Taking care of our people is the most important thing we can do as 
leaders.  The mission is important and technology is amazing, but without 
the Sailors there is no chance of success PRC (SEAL) Musselman, 
Atlantic Fleet Sailor of the Year  
(Padluck, 2003) 
A. REQUIRED SEAL MANNING INCREASE 
 
The Pentagon is currently planning to gradually increase the Navy's Sea Air Land 
(SEAL) force over the next several years to meet increasing global demands.  The 
increase was authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in a Program 
Decision Memorandum (PDM) in December 2002.  The PDM, which directed the growth 
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) across the board, called on the Navy to bring the 
equivalent of two new SEAL Teams, or roughly two hundred additional SEALs to the 
force between FY-06 and FY-08.  Even though funding has been allotted to this task, 
there is not enough NSW SEAL manpower to fill these slots.  Training and retention 
issues have brought the growth process to a standstill.  According to NSWC (personal 
communication, 2004 November 26) in 2003 there were 160 new acquisitions of NSW 
personnel.  In the same year there were 158 losses due to retirement and resignation 
(Appendix A), or a net increase of 2 SEALs in 2003.  At this rate NSW should meet its 
growth goal in 100 years. 
As a result of OSD’s direction, over 200 new SEALs will be brought on board. 
NSW currently consists of approximately 2,700 operators: 2,100 SEALs and 600 Special 
Warfare Combat Craft (SWCC) personnel.  These operators make up less that one 
percent of the U.S. Navy personnel (“SEALs Focus”, 2003, p. 3).  However, for the 
purposes of this thesis, we will concentrate on the 1500 enlisted SEAL operators.  
Funding for their new billets will come from the Navy's manpower account. In addition, 
the NSW Command is also attempting to achieve funding in the next Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) cycle for new instructors and support staff to meet training and 
support requirements for the growing SEAL force. 
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The increase marks a significant development for the NSW community, which 
has traditionally been reluctant to enlarge the SEAL program.  There has been a fear that 
growing the force too quickly could water down talent.  But, with the expansion of the 
War on Terrorism (WOT), and the increasing requirement for SEALs to join that fight, it 




The history of the SEAL Teams dates back to 1942 with the formation of the 
Naval Combat Demolition Unit (NCDU) at Fort Pierce, Florida.  The men who were 
selected for the program came from the Naval Construction Battalions and the 
Navy/Marine Corps Scout and Raider Volunteers.  All had extensive swim experience 
and all were in superb physical condition.  The training was not too different fifty years 
ago from that of today, consisting of a great deal of physical training, swimming, and 
demolitions.  The stress level was high by design, with training conducted day and night 
in the swamps of Ft. Pierce with alligators on the beaches and offshore (Halberstadt, 
1993, p. 31). 
While these warriors fought courageously in both World War II and Korea, the 
SEALs themselves were not officially born until 1 January 1962, when President 
Kennedy commissioned SEAL Team One for the Pacific theater and SEAL Team Two 
for the Atlantic theater.  The original mission was to conduct Naval Special Warfare 
missions, which then meant unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla, and clandestine 
operations in maritime and riverine environments.  Their primary capabilities were to: 1) 
destroy enemy shipping and harbor facilities; 2) infiltrate and extract friendly force 
agents, guerrillas, and escapees; 3) conduct reconnaissance and surveillance; 4) conduct 
counterinsurgency civic action; and 5) organize, train, and lead paramilitary forces. 
(Halberstadt, 1993, p. 31) 
In terms of physical fitness and overall mission purpose, the modern SEALs are 
very similar to their predecessors.  In addition, they have kept up with current technology 
and tactics.  However, as of 1 October 2001, NSW has reorganized under a new concept 
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for the twenty first century (NSW-21).  Under this new concept, a SEAL Team’s mission 
is to man, equip, train, deploy, and sustain SEAL platoons in support of regional and 
theater commanders as directed.  The command deploys as an NSW Squadron to conduct 
Special Operation Force (SOF) missions and other taskings as directed by both joint and 
fleet war fighting commanders.  The Commander of the Naval Special Warfare 
Command (CNSWC) is the final decision point for the deploying of NSW Forces.  
CNSWC is responsible for providing trained and ready NSW forces to theater Special 
Operations Commanders (SOCs) and other component commanders, consisting of 
maritime, ground, and air components (“Naval Special”, 2002).  The types of operations 
SEALs are trained for include: Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), 
Combating Terrorism (CT), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Personnel Recovery (PR), 
Hydrographic Reconnaissance, Counter-Drug Operations (CD), Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID), and Information Warfare Assistance (IW).  The primary mission areas for NSW 
consist of the core missions DA and SR.  The Special Boat (SBT) and Swimmer Delivery 
Vehicle (SDV) Teams provide the internal mobility assets and personnel to support NSW 
and other Special Operations Forces’ missions (“SEALs Focus”, 2003).  Since the events 
on 9/11, all SEAL Teams on both coasts have been heavily employed in the War on 
Terrorism.   
Conducting a global War on Terrorism requires a large number of highly 
specialized and qualified personnel; this number is even larger when non-critical 
peacetime missions are still considered requirements by SOF leadership.  Moreover, there 
is reluctance among combatant commanders to reduce engagement “requirements,” such 
as theater security cooperation events in various NATO countries.  Because the NSW 
community is fulfilling all of these various SEAL engagement roles during wartime, 
there is an even higher corresponding demand for NSW operators, specifically SEALs.  
This situation has created a problem for SEAL training, manning, and retention.  The 
question, then, is how can NSW grow and sustain the force while not watering down 





C. MANNING ISSUES 
 
The primary personnel issue related to training revolves around the fact that, 
historically, only 25% of the Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL (BUD/S) candidates 
who start training will actually graduate.  With a 75% attrition rate, growing the SEAL 
force becomes especially problematic.  The existing pipeline consists of Navy Basic 
Training (three months), BUD/S Training (six months), SEAL Qualification Training 
(SQT:  six months), Jump School (one month) and a SEAL Team workup (approximately 
eighteen months).  This training process, which must take place before any operational 
SEAL deployment, takes a minimum of two and a half years.  The projected cost of 
sending a candidate through BUD/S is approximately $500,000.  According to NSWC, 
the cost of the entire training pipeline to fully train a new enlisted SEAL is approximately 
$1 million (personal communication, 2004 November 26).  
 
Table 1. Seal Training Pipeline: 
 
TRAINING:   MONTHS:
Basic Training    3 
BUDS     6 
SQT     6 
Jump School    1 
Platoon work-up   18 
Total:     34 
The first chance for an enlisted frogman to leave the military comes after 4 years 
of service.  Since the average annual losses due to resignation or retirement have been  
126 SEALs per year (Appendix A), and the final cost of training a SEAL is $1,000,000, 
then NSW currently loses an average of $126 million a year to resignations and/or 
retirements.  All this money and training is wasted as soon as a SEAL steps out the door 
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to the civilian world.  Furthermore, in most cases, his immediate superiors are helpless 
and can only put up passive resistance in order to prevent him from leaving.   
The modern SEAL platoon, made up of 16 men, is a formidable fighting force in 
any arena.  It contains some of the most well trained commandos in the world.  The 
standard platoon will have, on average, 5 new personnel who are starting their 
prospective careers as SEALs.  The platoon training, during an 18 month work-up cycle, 
is directly affected by new personnel in the platoon.  In this regard, training can only 
progress as fast as the new personnel can safely and competently conduct the training.  
SEAL training is inherently dangerous and pushing people past a safe limit is 
unacceptable.  Training outside of safe limits can result in dangerous incidents and 
possibly death, yet SEALs are expected to train in as realistic conditions as possible 
during training.  A common saying within the NSW community is, “The more you bleed 
in training, the less you will in combat.”  If manning and retention issues result in too few 
SEALs, the average number of new SEAL operators in platoons will continue to rise and 
have a corresponding effect on training.  In fact, already, the SEAL Teams are starting to 
see platoons with considerably more than 5 “new guys,” which significantly slows down 
the rate at which a platoon can conduct advanced training.  
If retention could be increased, platoons would enjoy the opportunity to conduct a 
more complex and comprehensive work-up training cycle.  In turn, the quality of the 
SEAL operator produced would be exponentially higher.  The work-ups could 
concentrate more on advanced Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) while 
significantly increasing the skill level of the platoon as a whole.  The current SEAL 
Platoon is allotted 18 months to prepare for an overseas deployment.  Yet, at least one-
third of that work-up training time is dedicated to ensuring new SEAL operators are 
completely comfortable with the platoon Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prior to 
an overseas deployment.  By increasing retention, less “new guy” work-up time would be 
required.  Historically, 6 months of a platoon work-up is dedicated to teaching new 
SEALs basic tactics while reinforcing the same fundamentals for the more experienced 
operators in the platoon.  Essentially, without the influx of new SEALs, platoons could 
concentrate on advanced SEAL training for all 18 months of the work-up cycle, instead 
of spending 6 months of each cycle going over the basic skills for the newest operators.  
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The NSW community could effectively raise the probability of mission success and 
reduce the casualty rate for all operations with these more experienced platoons.  
Additionally, the knowledge base for planning operations would be increased with 




Retention is a large concern for all components of the military.  Enlisted retention 
within the NSW community is no exception.  Even after six months of grueling training 
at BUD/S, the demanding training never stops.  Most is undertaken at remote stateside 
locations and, consequently, for most enlisted NSW personnel the separation from 
families is long and frustrating.  Following 18 months of training in the United States, 
SEAL platoons are deployed overseas for six months in support of combatant 
commanders where, again, the training never stops in order for the SEALs remain razor 
sharp for short-notice contingency missions. 
However, while deployed, many SEAL platoons are sent to engage in training 
with foreign counterparts, or they sit and wait at forward deployed units for the 
contingency that never comes.  At the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, one of the 
justifications for more NSW platoons not being sent into the area immediately was that 
the platoons were needed for contingency plans and could not be spared.   This priority 
structure did not sit well with most NSW operators who saw the war as a priority over 
either foreign training engagements or possible contingencies.      
Such commandos typically join the military not only for the pay, but also because 
they desire to do a job for their country.  A common response by an NSW operator when 
asked why he joined the SEALs is, “Not for the money.”  In fact, research has shown that 
pay rarely rates as one of the top three motivators in employee surveys (Collins and 
Devanna, 1990, p.225).  Money does, however, become a factor after years of experience, 
and particularly after young frogmen turn into older experienced SEALs with wives and 
families.  Also, quality of life becomes an issue for many SEALs when the benefits of the 
job stop outweighing the sacrifices, and when they feel that their personal sacrifices are 
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not being rewarded.  A growing number of SEALs are leaving the community thanks to 
the financial opportunities offered by the Private Military Industry (PMI), which has 
grown exponentially since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Older 
SEALs who value time with families and quality of life are starting to move towards 
these PMI careers.  On average a SEAL can earn between $150,000 and $300,000 
working security details in overseas combat zones (Heylar, 2004, p. 81).  The average 
pay for an enlisted SEAL is approximately $50,000 (DFAS, 2003).  While in-country,  
PMI positions may involve the same amount of time away from home and family, they 
do not involve extensive traveling from home to train when personnel are not overseas.   
One way to combat the temptation for enlisted NSW personnel to leave the force 
for such PMIs is to increase the pay that SEALs receive.  The CNO has stated that 
Targeted bonuses such as SRBs (Selective Reenlistment Bonuses) are 
critical to our ability to compete for our highly trained and talented 
workforce both within the Navy and with employers across the nation as 
well. Proper funding, adequate room for growth and the flexible 
authorities needed to target the right skills against the right market forces 
are important to the shape of the workforce. This program specifically 
targets retention bonuses against the most critical skills we need for our 
future (Vern Clark, 2004).    
However, even taking into account the SRB combined with a period of American 
economic growth, the military has been hard pressed to match the corresponding 
paychecks for PMI jobs in the civilian sector during this time of war.  As will be shown 
in Chapter 3, SRBs are not playing enough of a role in the retention of quality SEAL 
operators.  Even with these bonuses, specialty pays, various allowances, life insurance 
benefits, retirement benefits, and family medical benefits, the Navy is having a difficult 
time keeping pace with the significant pay being offered by the private sector. 
Another retention strategy to be discussed will be alternatives to the current 
retirement plan for enlisted SEALs.  An enlisted SEAL, like any member of the military, 
can retire with full benefits after 20 years of service.  However, in most cases, that same 
SEAL is far from being able financially to stop working.  Current retirement pay and 
benefits fall well short of providing the equivalent quality of life that is offered during 
military service.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, retirement pay does not appear to be 
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enough of an incentive to keep an enlisted SEAL operator in the Teams, especially with 
PMI companies actively recruiting SEALs with recent war-time experience.  In that 
regard, retirement benefits, not just pay, need to be augmented in order to keep quality 
personnel in the Teams. 
Retention has been a major focus for several years within NSW and continues to 
be a high priority today.  A similar problem to the current issue of the enlisted retention 
occurred several years ago in the officer community.  The mass exodus started in 1997 
when a large number of SEAL officers removed themselves from the ranks of active duty 
frogmen.  In 1997 a survey was conducted by Naval Special Warfare leaders to try and 
figure out why the officers were getting out.  During resignation interviews of 15 SEAL 
officers, all holding the rank of Lieutenant, “Most officers expressed frustration in 
believing that they would never be used in missions for which they were trained.  This 
was a prevalent theme for almost all officers interviewed.  It was cited by many as having 
a strong influence on their decision to leave the Navy” (Davids, 1998, p.94).  The original 
NSW consensus before 9/11 was that SEALs were getting out due to the lack of 
meaningful employment.  Yet, post-9/11, the SEAL Teams have been heavily engaged in 
the WOT.  What, then, is the determining factor for enlisted SEALs now?  Unless this 
question can be answered and addressed, NSW cannot hope to meet its future staffing 
requirements.  For the fact remains, this retention problem plagues NSW by depriving the 
community of both well trained personnel and the critical funds which are wasted by 
training personnel who ultimately leave.  
Immediately after 9/11, a high tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) seemed to have 
a desirable effect on NSW retention and appeared to be the catalyst for increased 
retention throughout the community.  There were increased retention numbers for both 
NSW officers and enlisted sailors.  The FY02 retention numbers were up for all SEALs, 
SWCC, and support personnel (Appendix A).  Now, however, there appears to be a trend 
towards SEALs once again looking to leave because they are deployed too much and not 
always employed for what they consider to be true SEAL missions.   
By comparison, the regular Navy is also having the same problem with retention 
and has implemented its own initiatives.  The regular Navy used to have the luxury of 
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withstanding a high turnover rate, and actually saved money by keeping work force 
salaries at the lower pay levels.  This will not remain the case since jobs are getting more 
technologically advanced in all areas of the Navy.  The problems with recruiting first-
term enlistees are exacerbated by the fact that the Navy has historically lost about one-
third of its enlistees before they have completed their initial terms of service.  The other 
services are also focusing attention on the retention problem and how to keep airmen, 
sailors, marines, and soldiers in the military.  “To obtain this type of information, DOD 
and the services are making progress collecting accurate data on why people leave the 
service early” (GAO Report, 2004).   
Current NSW enlisted retention is above Navy averages and at the end of FY04 
was at 68.8% (Appendix A).  Although this is better than the community retention rate in 
FY03 (65.8%), NSW still needs to improve retention in order to meet the desired end-
state of increasing personnel by 200 enlisted SEALs.  With the current surge of SEAL 
Team deployments in support of the WOT, the corresponding strain of time overseas will 
increase and NSW can expect even lower retention rates in the future if the issue is not 




Larger conventional forces are no longer the answer in an age of asymmetric 
warfare. Today’s military needs to fight with highly qualified and trained professionals 
such as the members of the NSW community.  However, if NSW does not compete with 
other civilian companies, the SEAL community will fail to retain the top performers and, 
in the end, the cost will be failed missions and lives lost.  In today’s military, there is still 
a conventional human resources mode of thinking that needs to be replaced with modern 
corporation human resource techniques.  The NSW community is, quite simply, in 
competition for human resources with other contracting security companies.  To not think 
along these lines and to assume there will always be loyalty to the SEAL Teams would be  
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a critical mistake for NSW.  If a change is not made, the SEAL community will lose a 
large portion of experienced operators to competing security companies such as 
Blackwater and Dyncorp.   
There needs to be an NSW examination of the long term impact of personnel 
retention strategies.  In short, the current strategy must change in order to maintain a 
SEAL force structure that will achieve mission success.  A required element for retaining 
these special operators is sending them to conduct real world operations; in essence, 
doing the job they signed up for.  If SEALs are not conducting operations, yet are still 
deployed far from home while training or waiting for a contingency, there must be some 
monetary compensation offered that can and will compete with the compensation offered 
by PMI companies.  Utilizing two models, this thesis will demonstrate that, as much as 
loyal frogmen hate to admit it, pay is an integral piece of the puzzle for SEALs when 
making important career decisions and future plans for themselves as well as their 
families. 
Not everyone who makes it through SEAL training desires to remain in the 
community.  Although the average retention rate for the last four years is not bad when 
compared to the Navy as a whole, there are still too many SEALs getting out of the 
community to match the OSD stated goal of 200 more SEALs by FY08.  In the last four 
years, over 500 SEALs left the Navy; if that average resignation and retirement rate were 
cut by 40%, the manning increase problem would be solved without even examining 
and/or changing attrition rates at BUD/S.  Additionally, these retained operators would be 
experienced SEALs, not “new guys.” 
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The goal of this chapter will be to create an expected value model which shows 
the most ideal method for increasing Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL manning and 
growth requirements.  NSW manning needs to grow by approximately 50 enlisted SEALs 
each calendar year in order to achieve OSD and CNO mandated manning levels for two 
new SEAL Teams by 2008.  We currently have a little over 1500 enlisted SEALs in the 
NSW community and need at least 200 more to achieve this goal.  Of note, the current 
inventory for enlisted SEAL billets is resting at about 89% of the authorized billets.  The 
200 enlisted SEAL increase mentioned above does not take into account this inventory 
gap between the current 89% and a possible 100% enlisted SEAL billet inventory.  
For this problem, we will concentrate on the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL 
(BUD/S) graduating class size.  There are five classes per year and the current class sizes 
average 180 candidates; the attrition rate is historically 75%.  That means, on average, 45 
BUD/S candidates graduate from each class.  In order to completely satisfy the OSD 
requirement of 200 additional enlisted SEALs by 2008, these annual numbers need to 
increase from 225 graduating candidates (45 per class) to 275.   In this chapter, we will 
discuss three possible solutions for increasing the number of BUD/S graduates.  Our 
possible solutions will include: a) increasing the number of candidates attending BUD/S 
by increasing input numbers, b) improving the quality of candidates for BUD/S before 
they ever show up in Coronado, or c) a combination of both increasing the input and 
improving the quality of candidates with orders to BUD/S.  
 
1. Assumptions 
In order to set up courses of action (COAs) for an expected value (EV) model, the 
following assumptions have been made based on a historical drop-out (attrition) rate of 
75%.  Assumptions: 
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The incoming candidate physical readiness test (PRT) standards will remain the 
same. 
The physical training standards during BUD/S will not change for candidates. 
For the purposes of the model, class sizes will be defined as 180 candidates (the 
current capacity for any given BUD/S class). 
The Navy Recruiting process remains unchanged. 
Data used in the model will be from FY01-FY04.  The post-9/11 data reflects the 
effect of deployments in support of the War on Terrorism. 
The attrition rates are based on historical data from the NSW Training Command 
in Coronado, California as well as data from the Community Manager in 
Washington D.C. 
“New Accessions” are SEALs who have successfully completed the BUD/S 
training pipeline. 
 
2. The Model 
The overall goal must be an average increase of 50 New Accessions each year in 
order to achieve the goal of 200 new enlisted SEALs in the NSW community (see Table 
2).  When taking into account the averages among New Accessions, retirements, and 
resignations, there is a current annual average net gain of 2 personnel in the NSW 
community.   
The first COA, or COA-A, pursues the idea of maintaining a constant input 
number, yet decreasing the attrition rate of 75% by increasing the quality of the input 
through improved recruiting techniques.  Another way to state this is to increase the 
graduation rate (GR) through a higher quality input.  According to NSWC, historically 
the GR at BUD/S is only 25% (personal communication, 2004 November 26).  COA-B 
represents the option of increasing the input numbers for BUD/S training, but not 
changing the GR.  In other words, we would see more candidates showing up for training, 
and ideally the 25% GR would remain the same, therefore increasing the number of New 
Accessions or BUD/S graduates.  COA-C represents a combination of both COA-A and 
COA-B. 















B. COA-A (BETTER RECRUITING) 
 
To change the characteristics of the input (candidate coming to BUD/S) we need 
to examine the quality of the individuals coming to Coronado from Boot Camp.  If a 
candidate is mentally and physically prepared for the demands of BUD/S, there is an 
increased EV for successful completion of the course.  Currently, the majority of BUD/S 
candidates are screened at Boot Camp for compatibility with the SEAL training program.  
After a successful SEAL PRT and a recommendation from the SEAL Motivator (one of 
the SEALs who administers the PRT) at Boot Camp, the prospective BUD/S candidate is 
usually recommended for BUD/S and will eventually receive orders from his detailer to 
the NSW Training Center in Coronado.  The graduation rate in COA-A is a function of 
the tough standards of BUD/S and the quality of individual inputs. 
The main goals of any personnel selection system are to hire qualified applicants 
and to fairly assess the ability of all applicants (Muchinsky, 2003, p. 169).  More focus on 
the recruiter’s office and the procedure of getting new Navy recruits out of the civilian 
sector may be beneficial to the process of increasing the quality of the BUD/S input.  
Instead of having BUD/S determine who is qualified to meet the required abilities, the 
process could (and probably should) be done sooner at the recruiter level.  It is important 
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to test mental and physical capabilities prior to a candidate entering BUD/S in order to 
determine if he will make it through the training or not.  In order for BUD/S candidates 
with a higher chance of success to arrive at Boot Camp, the recruiters and/or SEAL 
Motivators would need to reach out to High Schools, sports clubs, the Boy Scouts, 
JROTC, collegiate athletic programs, and the community in general in order to get these 
“better” candidates into the initial Navy training pipeline that would culminate with 
BUD/S. 
One of the significant hurdles facing recruiters is the 4 year commitment contract 
that a new recruit must sign prior even to attending boot camp in order to “try out” for 
BUD/S.  If the recruits do not make it to, or fail out of, BUD/S they are left with a 
considerable commitment to the Navy for four years of difficult shipboard duty.  This is a 
substantial military commitment for well qualified candidates who also have many 
promising career opportunities in the private sector.  These private sector jobs usually do 
not require any sort of commitment that compares to 4 years of mandatory service in the 
US Navy.   
In order to recruit the best of the best out of the private sector, the NSW 
community needs to have a program in place that will allow for an initial screening test 
with an “out” option for those BUD/S candidates who do not make it through SEAL 
training in Coronado.  The proposal is that when a perspective BUD/S candidate walks 
into the recruiter’s office, he would be eligible for a program that allows him to attempt 
BUD/S training without being locked into a Navy commitment when he signs on the 
dotted line in the recruiter’s office.  The SEAL Motivator program could assist in this 
aspect of screening prior to a candidate signing an enlistment contract.  Of course, there 
may be considerable hurdles with this proposal stemming from the fact that the candidate 
would not be subjected to the same enlistment terms as other enlistees.  However, the 
changes required in order to get more qualified personnel in the SEAL training pipeline 
will certainly necessitate significant changes to the current recruiting standard operating 
procedures.  
In June of 2002, a thesis was submitted at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California by two Special Forces Officers researching a way to increase the 
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number of qualified recruits for the United States Army Special Forces Command 
(USASFC).  The title of the thesis is:  Tactics, Methods and Techniques to Improve 
Special Forces In-Service Enlisted Recruiting.  In this thesis Robert Burrell and Steve 
Swierkowski examined the recruiting practices of several large private sector firms.  The 
issues described in their thesis are similar to the issues that NSW faces today.  Some of 
the conclusions they reached in their study are listed below (Burrell & Swierkowski, 
2002, p. 51): 
Target the best. 
Raise recruitment standards. 
Begin tracking and measuring recruiter effectiveness. 
Attach the recruiter’s name to everyone he recruits. 
Establish a formal candidate referral program. 
Improve recruiter knowledge of those for whom he is recruiting. 
Send the best officers and non-commissioned officers to lead recruitment efforts. 
Ensure that rewards and incentives support the bottom-line. 
These conclusions for SF recruitment practices should be closely scrutinized by 
NSW personnel involved with enlisted SEAL recruiting.  These are techniques utilized 
by corporate head-hunters as well as coaching staffs of professional football teams.  We 
would note that none of the eight conclusions listed above currently apply to acquiring a 
perspective BUD/S candidate from the civilian world and persuading him to join the 
Navy. 
Regardless of how recruiting can be adjusted, the NSW community should do 
everything possible to ensure a BUD/S candidate is fully prepared for the arduous six 
months of SEAL training which is followed by 28 months of follow-on training before 
that graduate’s first deployment overseas.  There is an NSW program in place used to 
help prepare perspective officer candidates for the environment of BUD/S.  The program, 
termed “Mini-BUD/S,” is held twice each year and may help explain why officers enjoy 
a much higher GR than enlisted candidates.  Historically, 65% of officer BUD/S 
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candidates graduate from the program (NSWC personal communication, 2004 November 
26).  In general, Mini-BUD/S introduces a BUD/S officer candidate to the harsh physical 
and mental treatment he can expect to see when he “classes up.”  Mini-BUD/S officer 
candidates are exposed to a portion of every phase of BUD/S training.  They experience 
the cold water, sleep deprivation, and the generally stressful environment they will 
encounter in the BUD/S compound.  Most importantly, these officer candidates become 
mentally prepared for BUD/S. 
Mini-BUD/S not only tests the officer applicants for the basic qualifications it will 
take to make it through BUD/S, but the program also gives the applicant a preview of 
what BUD/S entails.  A preview allows the applicant a chance to see if he actually fits 
into the position he is seeking (Muchinsky, 2003, p.136).  By allowing an enlisted 
candidate to determine whether he is willing to go through the harsh environment of 
BUD/S or not, the NSW community would be giving an enlisted BUD/S candidate the 
opportunity to drop from training before he actually reports to BUD/S.  An unintended 
consequence of allowing a perspective candidate to drop from training before actually 
starting would be that another BUD/S candidate would be afforded the opportunity to 
become a BUD/S candidate.  This alternative technique of allowing personnel to gain a 
preview of what is in store for them would increase the BUD/S GR. 
A small increase in the GR can represent a significant increase in the number of 
graduates every year (See Table 3).  While maintaining a constant numerical input of 180 
candidates per class (or 900 per year), NSW must change the characteristics of the input 
number in order to create a higher GR.  When the EV (COA-A) = 275 New Accessions 
each year, NSW will be satisfying the CNO requirement.  If 25% of 900 new BUD/S 
candidates successfully complete BUD/S (225 graduates), then the annual goal of 50 
additional graduates will be attained with a slightly higher GR of 30.6%: 
 





)......275( ==  (desired GR) 
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26% 28% 30% 32% 34% 36% 38% 
Number of  
Graduates 
234 252 270 288 306 324 342 
 
Ideally, a GR of 30.6% is required to meet the required number of New 
Accessions each year.  If (COA-A) ≥.306, then NSW will have a successful model 
resulting in at least 275 graduates each year  which matches the goals as set forth in Table 
4.  However, a pure COA-A strategy may be un-realistic.  Later, we will look at a 
possible combination of both COA-A and B. 
 















C.  COA-B (MORE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING) 
 
The opposing COA to the above option displays the number of New Accessions 
(output) as a direct function of the number of BUD/S candidates brought into the program 
(input).  If 225 candidates are currently graduating each year with a 25% GR, then it 
would follow, as in COA-A, that there is an initial input of 900 candidates.  However, in 
this case, if the growth goal is a net increase of 50 New Accessions each year (275 total 
BUD/S graduates per year), then the desired input for COA-B would be 1100 candidates.  
In a pure COA-B scenario, 1100 BUD/S candidates would need to attend BUD/S each 
year, or 220 in each class.  That means 40 additional candidates for each class (220-180 = 
40) and 200 additional candidates per year (see Table 5).   
 
















The question for the NSW community is how to find another 200 Navy personnel 
each year that can still achieve the 25% GR.  On the surface, this COA appears to work. 
However, there may be problems with a pure strategy of simply increasing the input to 
increase the resulting output.  For example, if candidates are to still come straight from 
the same input sources, there may be a watering down of PRT standards in order to meet 
a “quota” for each class.  
If PRT standards are lowered for any reason, the result will most probably be a 
higher attrition rate at BUD/S (or a lower GR).  We could, theoretically, see a COA-B 
situation where the required 1100 candidates attend BUD/S, yet the graduating numbers 
still hover at 225 or lower because of a less-qualified pool of candidates.  Setting a quota 
for the input number without making any adjustments for pursuing a “better” candidate 
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could result in not only less than 1100 graduates during any given year, but 
circumstances could exist where there would be even fewer graduates than NSW sees 
today.  Additionally, since putting a candidate through BUD/S costs approximately 
$500,000, another 200 candidates would cost the Navy an additional $100,000,000 each 
year (NSWC, personal communication, 2004 November 26). The possible watering down 
of PRT standards, as well as increased overhead costs for new military construction, 
more instructors, more training equipment, more vehicles, and more boats may pave the 




Although, in theory, each of the aforementioned COAs could solve the BUD/S 
graduation problem, each EV is really a function of candidate motivation, physical 
preparation, and natural ability.  While concentrating only on the quality of input may be 
unrealistic, simply increasing the input numbers may be cost prohibitive.  The “needs of 
the Navy” may require a combination of both COAs instead.  For example, the ideal 
combination may be to accept 960 candidates to BUD/S during a given year (192 
candidates per class) and strive for a new GR of 28.6% (highlighted in Table 6).  Each of 
the combinations in Table 6 represents an annual percentage GR on top and the 
corresponding number of BUD/S candidates that would start training that year on the 
bottom.  Each combination results in a net increase of 50 new BUD/S graduates each 
year.  Additionally, Appendix B shows the input number of candidates required 
throughout the entire possible range of graduation rates (0-100%).  
  
Table 6. GR and associated INPUT to obtain net gain of 50 graduates per year 
 
.306 .299 .293 .286 .281 .275 .270 .264 .259 .255 .250 





Whether or not an individual will make it through Basic Underwater Demolition / 
SEAL training depends on countless different variables.  A candidate’s age, Navy rating, 
experience in the Navy, physical and mental readiness, hobbies, background in high 
school sports, and the psychological motivation to graduate from BUD/S are just a few of 
the unknowns.  Many in the NSW community feel that a pure COA-B will satisfy the 
new OSD requirements.  However, based on the steep hyperbola curve depicted in 
Appendix B, there are significant problems with the COA-B option.  For example, there 
could be a slight and unforeseen drop in GR for one year.  If the average GR for a year 
were to drop to 20% with COA-B, the number of candidates required to meet that year’s 
quota of 275 graduates would jump to 1375 candidates.  That is 475 more BUD/S 
candidates than the NSW training center sees during a year when every BUD/S school 
billet is taken.  The corollary to this is that a corresponding 5% drop in GR given the 
COA-A strategy (from 30.6% to 25.6% retention) only equates to an additional 183 
required candidates, 292 less candidates than would be required in COA-B to make up 
for the difference in GR (see Appendix B).  Due to the financial requirements for 
building and supporting a significantly larger SEAL training course, if NSW were to 
follow the COA-B approach, the more logical response would be to lean toward COA-A, 
with some modifications. 
For instance, if a feasibility study could be completed in order to determine how 
many more BUD/S candidates could be accepted based on existing barracks, equipment, 
and instructors, we would have a COA-B number to enter into Table 6 or Appendix B for 
a combined solution.  The resulting GR percentage would then be the new graduation 
goal for the training center.  The true challenge for the NSW community would then be to 
create a program instead of (or in addition to) the current SEAL Motivator program at 
Boot Camp.  If perspective candidates were routed through a Mini-BUD/S type of 
program, the GR could be expected to rise significantly, ideally at the rates depicted in 
Table 6. 
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Of course, there are significant hurdles involved with the integration of an 
enlisted Mini-BUD/S type of program.  But, if the NSW community could examine the 
SEAL Motivator program, there may already be a foundation upon which to build.  
Essentially, the SEAL Motivator program could be evaluated, changed, and expanded in 
order to absorb some more of the recruiting responsibility.  SEAL Motivators could play 
an essential role in recruiting at the grass roots level. 
However, it seems that growing the SEAL force by recruiting and training 
improvements alone may not ultimately raise the enlisted SEAL force to the desired 
level.  The only feasible way to achieve the goal of two new SEAL Teams by 2008 may 
be to utilize these improvements in conjunction with NSW retention improvements.  
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IV. INCREASING NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE RETENTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
In this Chapter, we have created another expected value (EV) model which 
suggests an ideal method for increasing Naval Special Warfare (NSW) enlisted SEAL 
retention.  In the last four years, there have been positive retention gains realized 
throughout the NSW community.  However, there are still key areas where the 
percentages of retained personnel are dropping significantly.  In order to increase the 
NSW billet inventory by 200 SEAL operators by the end of FY08, a strategy needs to be 
adopted that not only yields an increased graduation rate from BUD/S (see Chapter 2), 
but increases retention for current operators to include seasoned veterans who have over 
20 years of experience.   
To develop this strategy, we will concentrate on two categories of NSW operator.  
Both groups have been identified in Appendix A, which identifies five categories that 
apply to the enlisted SEAL community. Specifically, we examined two enlisted SEAL 
categories that appear to suggest opportunity for improvement in the recorded retention 
percentages.  The first Category is represented by SEALs with 10-14 years experience in 
the Navy and/or on the Teams.  The second group consists of those operators with over 
20 years of experience and, in turn, eligible for retirement from the military.  By creating 
a model that concentrates on these two classes of NSW personnel, we will be able to 
identify the most logical area on which the NSW leadership should concentrate its efforts 
in order to increase retention as soon as possible.   
 
1. Assumptions 
The retention rates in this Chapter are all based on historical data from the NSW 
Command Headquarters in Coronado, California, as well as data from the Community 
Managers in Washington D.C. and Millington, TN.  In order to set up an EV model, the 
following assumptions have been made:   
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Retention numbers will come from only enlisted SEAL data and will not include 
Special Warfare Combat Craft (SWCC) personnel.  
Base Pay will remain the same and will continue to follow historical annual 
increases. 
Requirements and periodicity of promotion will remain unchanged. 
Deployment cycles and rotations will not change significantly. 
The current SEAL basic training pipeline will remain the same. 
Deployment work-up training cycles will follow the current template. 
The Navy Recruiting process will remain unchanged. 
 
2. The Model 
The goal of the retention model is to show NSW leadership where to focus 
retention efforts.  Answers to retention questions in the past have ranged from shorter 
deployments and less time away from home, to simply more money for the enlisted 
sailor.  However, there appears to be a strong correlation between retention and overall 
pay.  The bottom line for many enlisted SEALs, especially those who have been around 
for a while, seems to be money.  
When looking at SEAL specialty pay today versus the same pay in the late 1960s, 
there is a valid argument that none of the various forms of enlisted SEAL specialty pay 
have kept up with the value of the dollar.  Today, an enlisted SEAL is eligible for 
demolition pay, jump pay, and dive pay on a monthly basis.  During Vietnam, a Frogman 
could count on 36% of his paycheck coming from various forms of hazardous duty 
supplemental pay (Troy, personal communication, 2004 November 20).  Today, such 
specialty pay makes up less than twenty percent of an enlisted SEAL’s paycheck.  
Obviously, there is a strong case for a significant increase in monetary compensation for, 
arguably, the toughest job in the military.  Organizations that wish to attract and retain 
competent employees have to pay competitive wages.  If wages are set too low, 
competent people will obtain better paying jobs elsewhere (Muchinsky, 2003, p. 74). 
Contracting out tasks which are not part of a business’s core competency, is a 
trend that is growing exponentially.  The military has also taken this business approach 
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onboard and is contracting out everything from logistics to personal protection in combat 
zones.  Although not a core SEAL mission or part of the Mission Essential Task List 
(METL), personal security detachment (PSD) has grown into a mission set for the SEAL 
Teams in the WOT.   Numerous studies in the private and public sector have concluded 
that this business practice of contracting out tasks can greatly reduce costs.  It is also a 
business that is likely to grow. 
With the decline of regional superpower conventional wars, conflicts important 
for national strategy and interests have become more difficult to pursue due to long term 
political repercussions.  Add to this the growing number of countries unable to provide 
their own national and regional security, which include the breakaway countries of the 
former Soviet Union (to include Azerbaijan, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) and African 
countries in conflict over natural resources (such as Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, and 
Nigeria).  Due to security concerns in the aforementioned areas and the need for 
additional security in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Private Military Industry (PMI) has 
significantly increased overseas security contracts.  For nation states, the utilization of 
these companies has proven to be less costly than maintaining large standing armies and 
less politically problematic than calling up reserve forces.  However, for these lucrative 
companies the short term profits have been very substantial. 
These firms have taken their toll on NSW and other SOF communities.  The PMI 
industry pay $150,000 to $300,000 a year for ex-SEALS to conduct similar jobs to those 
active duty SEALs are performing in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Helyar,  
2004, p.82).  This is 3 to 6 times the salary of Navy enlisted SEALs.  There is a growing 
retention concern within the NSW community as more and more SEALs interview with 
PMI companies such as Blackwater and Dyncorp.  As the requirements for SEAL 
operators increase in critical WOT regions, the community is seeing a downward slide in 
retention of experienced SEALs (Appendix A).   
The question, then, is not what would keep NSW operators in the job; but rather, 
how should money be used as leverage to help keep the reenlistments and retention at 
higher rates?  A simple model demonstrating two different COAs to answer this question 
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will be useful to those leaders who determine how much pay NSW personnel are to 
receive, and for what. 
While comparing the overall Navy retention percentages to those of the NSW 
community, we will use the CNSWC template which breaks down the years of service 
into categories.  The categories examined are separated by years of service.  For example, 
Category A represents a sailor with 0-6 years experience, while Category E represents 
20+ years of experience (see Table 7).   
 
Table 7. Category Per Years of Service 
 
Category Years Experience 
   A  0-6 yrs    
   B  6-10 yrs 
   C  10-14 yrs 
   D  14-20 yrs 
   E  Over 20 yrs 
 
In general, the NSW community has better retention than the Navy, and the 
retention trends often mirror those of the Navy as a whole.  However, in Category C, the 
2001 NSW retention percentage was higher than the Navy average, but in the last two 
years has steadily dropped to well below the Navy average (see Table 8).  Thus we will 
focus on this Category. Even though the NSW Category E numbers are consistently 
higher than the Navy averages, the retention percentage has been well below 50% for 
three of the last four years.  This represents another area where significant changes may 
benefit the NSW community (Appendix A).   
 
B. CATEGORY C RETENTION  
 
NSW personnel with between 10 and 14 years of experience in the Teams are, in 
most  cases,  men  with  at  least  three  operational  deployments.   They  are  the  SEALs  
growing into more important roles that require a varied and experienced operational 
background.  The SEAL Teams will lean heavily on today’s Category C personnel in the 
next decade. 
 















Retention percentages calculated in the Navy are a function of three figures: the 
number of personnel eligible for reenlistment, the number of personnel that actually 
reenlist, and the number of personnel separated from the service before the corresponding 
end of active obligatory service (EAOS).  In most cases, there is a significant difference 
between the reenlistment and retention percentages.  The reenlistment percentage deals 
solely with the numbers of eligible personnel that reenlist: 
 
NSW Reenlistment Percentage 
(# reenlisted) ÷ (#eligible) = reenlistment percentage 
 
However, there are often sailors throughout the Navy who are unable to complete 
their EAOS and are discharged from the Navy due to disciplinary action or medical 
problems.  The Category that accounts for these personnel is the “attrite” grouping, and is 
listed in Appendix A as “ATT.”   
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At the end of FY01, there were 133 Category C enlisted SEALs eligible for 
reenlistment.  Of the 133 eligible, 117 reenlisted and 2 personnel were discharged due to 
ATT (Appendix A).  In FY02, the retention numbers increased slightly by 3.6%, but in 
FY03 the Category C retention started a downward slide that the Big Navy did not 
experience.  As of 30 September 2004, 41 of the eligible 60 Category C enlisted SEALs 
reenlisted.  Nowhere in the overall Navy retention numbers, is there a downward trend 
such as the NSW SEAL Category C 22% decreases described above and in Appendix A. 
 
C. CATEGORY E RETENTION  
 
Category E SEALs also enjoy better retention rates than the Navy as a whole (see 
Table 9).  Yet, the numbers are still relatively low when compared to the other four NSW 
categories.  The obvious reason for this reduced retention percentage is that Category E 
personnel are eligible for military retirement at the 20 year mark.  However, as the WOT 
continues, SEALs with combat experience are becoming more important.   
 















One of the comprehensive goals of increased retention is to help the NSW 
community achieve the OSD mandated numbers for 2008.  In Chapter 2, we looked at 
possible avenues for improving BUD/S Graduation Rates with respect to increased input 
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as well as improved recruitment.  A combination of getting more qualified candidates 
through BUD/S and increasing key area retention percentages will certainly help the 
community achieve the necessary number of SEALs required to sustain a total enlisted 
SEAL force of over 1700 operators.   
In the case of FY04 Category C personnel, if a goal were set at 80% retention 
instead of 68%, we could expect to see 7 additional enlisted SEALs retained.  The same 
logic can be applied to all categories; however categories C and E provide the greatest 
opportunity for growth in required specialty areas.   
Category C SEALs make up 23% of the enlisted SEAL force, second only to the 
Category A SEALs.  Category C personnel are operators who are currently growing into 
a critical experience pool that will be essential in standardizing future Training, Tactics, 
and Procedures (TTPs) for the NSW community.  Category E SEALs are all seasoned 
operators, and if the NSW community is expected to create two new SEAL Teams by 
2008, these experienced personnel will provide essential mentorship and training critical 
to the growth of the NSW community.   
Both Category C and E personnel need to enjoy a higher retention rate.  The NSW 
community is currently looking at different options to raise the retention rates, but not 
necessarily focusing on these two specific categories.  The focus now appears to be 
primarily on Category E.  The dilemma is how to entice smart, experienced SEALs to 
stay with the NSW community; Category C personnel for twenty years and Category E 




The reasons a Sailor becomes a SEAL are numerous and personal.  Usually, an 
individual pursues a demanding career, such as a SEAL career, because he desires a 
lifestyle built around excitement, teamwork, bravery, loyalty, aggressiveness, and 
decisiveness.  The NSW community calls for creative individuals, sailors with good 
judgment  and  strong  convictions  to  guide  them  through  any challenge.  When a new  
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BUD/S candidate embarks on the long journey to the coveted Trident, he looks inward 
and is forced to thoroughly examine what it takes to motivate him through such a battery 
of tests of human endurance. 
However, as the years pass, and those BUD/S candidates become seasoned 
veterans with years of accumulated Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) and deployments, 
priorities often shift.  Key retention factors cited in the 1999 Community Climate Survey 
(results from the 2004 survey are not available as of this writing) include deployment and 
detailing satisfaction, career development, command climate, enjoyment of the job, and, 
most notably, financial compensation.  As most SEALs become more senior, pay and 
allowances to support families become a more central part of their lives.  Table 9 shows a 
Category E retention rate that is near or below the 40% retention rate with the exception 
of the year after 9/11.  Although this is better than the last four years of the entire Navy’s 
retention, a retirement pay incentive would, most probably, increase these numbers as 
well. 
We would like to suggest two possible paths to pursue with respect to increased 
retention.  The first idea is a significant increase in all forms of SEAL specialty pay and 
the second suggestion is an increased NSW retirement pay percentage for Category E 
SEALS.  These major changes should increase the reenlistment and retention rates in all 
SEAL enlisted categories, not just categories C and E. 
SEAL specialty pay has not significantly increased in over 30 years.  Today, there 
are occasional incremental increases, but the fact remains that in 1968 an enlisted SEAL 
Petty Officer (E-4) with over four years in the Navy was receiving 36% of his paycheck 
in the form of different kinds of specialty pay.   He received $305 per month for base pay 
(DFAS, 1968) and specialty pay in two areas (demolition and parachute pay) which 
added up to $110 (Troy, personal communication, 2004).  Conversely, today an enlisted 
SEAL can count on a maximum of three forms of specialty pay (demolition, parachute, 
and dive pay) which are representative of only 19% of his paycheck (Defense Link, 
2004).  An aggressive SOCOM campaign to increase specialty pay (ideally for all SOF) 
would be an ideal way to increase an operator’s take-home salary without having to touch 
the sensitive subject of changes to base pay. 
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Although we do not dedicate a Chapter to retirement pay, further study in this 
area could also reap huge benefits for retention.  Each year of service is worth 2.5% 
toward the retirement multiplier. Hence, 2.5% x 20 years = 50% and 2.5% x 30 years = 
75%. The longer an individual stays on active duty, the higher the multiplier and the 
higher the retirement pay, up to the maximum of 75 percent (DFAS Military Pay, 2004).  
Since the Commander of Special Operations Command (COMSOCOM) is the “supported 
commander” in the ongoing War on Terror, he may have the ability to make a change to 
the sensitive retirement system.  There should be a financial incentive to help keep those 
key experienced (Category E) personnel around well past the twenty-year mark to help 
train and lead the NSW community.  One option would be to increase the 30 year 
retirement (and associated multipliers) from 75% at 30 years to 100% at 30 years.   
    (2.5% x 20 years) + (5% x remaining 10 years) = (50% + 50%) = 100% retirement 
Therefore, 50% retirement at 20 years would still apply and the next ten years 
would look like Table 10. 
Table 10. Retirement % 
 
Yrs. Served 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 





Retention is the second half of the manning dilemma addressed in Chapter 2.  
However, in the world of enlisted SEAL retention, there are several more variables 
affecting whether a SEAL stays in the Navy than there are variables affecting the GR at 
BUD/S.   
This retention model is presented in simple terms, but requires an NSW 
community consensus on which one factor will play a crucial role in the retention of 
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SEAL operators.  When examining the retention issues for Category C and E, two items 
should be recalled from past NSW Community Climate Surveys (specifically the 1999 
survey).  SEALs are often gone; they are away from their families and not properly 
financially compensated for the time away.  Well over 30% of the enlisted SEALs are 
gone for 200-299 days each year (and a small percentage for over 300 days).  
Additionally, a vast majority of SEALs are paying out of pocket for housing and 
operational gear when those costs should be covered by allowances and/or specialty pay.   
Few would argue that quality of life is a key issue in the military.  The argument 
here is whether or not increased pay will improve that quality of life.  We believe more 
pay and greater benefits will equate to better retention and ultimately a sustained enlisted 
SEAL force of well over 1700 personnel starting in FY08.  More specialty pay and an 






















V. FINAL MODEL AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. FINAL MODEL 
 
In this last Chapter, we have created a model demonstrating the expected value 
(EV) for inputs into the SEAL Teams when utilizing a combination of the two EV 
models presented in Chapters II and III.  In the model below, we demonstrate that 
modified recruitment and training techniques (Chapter II), as well as unique and new 
approaches to NSW enlisted retention (Chapter III), can make the difference for the NSW 
community manning issues.  We show that by increasing NSW inventory growth, as well 
as improving the current retention process, the NSW community can increase the enlisted 
SEAL numbers while maintaining the enlisted SEAL billet inventory for future 
requirements.  In this chapter, we provide a tool for NSW leaders to utilize when making 
critical personnel inventory and retention decisions.  To calculate the EVs in this Chapter, 
we will be using the same assumptions as identified in Chapters I and II. 
In Chapter 2, we observed that by following COA-A (Table 3) an improvement in 
the quality of BUD/S recruits could lead to a significantly higher EV of graduating 
candidates and, as a result, more enlisted SEALs.  The current 25% graduation rate (GR) 
is routinely producing about 225 graduates each year in Coronado, nearly all of whom 
become SEALs.  Increasing the incoming BUD/S candidate GR by just over 5% (a GR of 
30.6%) would result in 50 more SEALs a year in a pure COA-A strategy from the 
inventory growth model described in Chapter 2.  
Table 11. Effect of increased retention rates (annually) 
 
Graduation 
Rate (GR) 26% 28% 30% 32% 34% 36% 38% 
Number of 




In Chapter III, we drew a correlation between retention and pay with a retention 
model.  We demonstrated that by focusing pay and benefit changes on Category C and E 
personnel, the NSW community could increase annual retention to a level that would 
invalidate the requirement for more BUD/S graduates as set forth in the Chapter II 
inventory growth model.  However, this unilateral approach would not address the long-
term requirement for a higher GR out of BUD/S.  Only concentrating on the retention 
model could fix short term manning inventory problems of the next 5-10 years.  But as 
the NSW community loses personnel to resignations and retirements, there would then be 
a need for an inventory growth model as described in Chapter II.   
Ideally, the FY08 goal of 200 additional enlisted SEAL billets at a sustained 
100% inventory would be met with a combination of COA-A (as described in Chapter II) 
and the increase to both pay and benefits addressed in Chapter III.   This multilateral 
approach to achieving a higher GR at BUD/S through improved recruiting and training 
practices while increasing retention of current operators though better pay and benefits 
presents will allow the NSW community to meet and/or exceed the manning level 
requirements as set forth by the Secretary of Defense.   
A possible combined solution is demonstrated below.  By increasing the BUD/S 
GR to 28% (only a 3 % increase from the current level) and increasing the retention of 
Category C and E personnel (utilizing FY04 figures in Appendix A) by 13.4% and 16.9% 
respectively, the NSW community would see the following results as quickly as FY05: 
(@ 28% GR, increase graduates by 27) + (@ 81.7% Category C Retention, 
increase SEALs by 8) + (@61.8% Category E Retention, increase SEALs by 15) = an 
increase in operators by 50 per year. 
Obviously, any combination of applicable numbers can fit into the above 
equation.  However, one key point is that Category C SEALs in FY04 have a much lower 
retention rate (68.3%) than the overall Navy (82.1%).  There is unquestionably room for 
improvement in all the enlisted categories, but Category C displays the largest disparity 
from the big Navy.   
The aforementioned policies will also have positive consequences that will help 
NSW achieve the goal of a sustained increase of 200 enlisted SEALs by FY08.  By 
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improving the quality of recruits sent to BUD/S (see COA-A in Chapter II), the need for 
expensive changes and renovations associated with increasing the number of recruits 
starting the program could be avoided (increasing inputs - Chapter II).  In other words, by 
concentrating on quality instead of quantity, the numbers of incoming candidates would 
be more manageable and costs would be driven down.  Additionally, the high cost of 
BUD/S attrition ($500,000 per candidate) will be minimized due to candidates arriving 
more mentally and physically prepared for the rigors of the NSW training pipeline.  
These unintended, yet positive, consequences will indirectly increase retention and SEAL 
manning levels. 
Furthermore, an increase in specialty pay and retirement benefits in specific 
categories will undoubtedly have long term benefits affecting the other categories, to 
include the newest SEALs in the community.  The increased pay may help retention in 
the lower categories (A & B) by giving those SEALs an increased incentive to stay in and 
reach the more senior enlisted categories where individuals are receiving better pay and 
benefits (specifically, Category E).  Also, by increasing retention of personnel at the more 
senior levels, the NSW community will witness a substantial increase in baseline 
knowledge of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  This, in turn, will help increase 
mission success and will help enlisted SEALs achieve greater job satisfaction.  
Additionally, the junior enlisted personnel will have more time to learn from their senior 




To satisfy the requirement for increased SEAL manning, the NSW community 
must examine options available in order to influence the variables in the model shown 
above.  It appears that addressing any one variable in of itself is insufficient to exact total 
successful change in the NSW community.  The NSW objective for increasing the 
enlisted SEAL inventory should include realistic methods to alter each independent 
variable and therefore create a large cumulative change by combining small incremental 
changes over time.  Some suggestions for NSW leaders are listed below: 
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NSW must strive for better qualified personnel for the initial BUD/S pipeline 
training in order to raise the percentage of graduating candidates who become SEALS.  
This can be done through more active recruiting and marketing to attract quality recruits.  
Recruiters should, ideally, engage a larger audience to get more qualified recruits and 
only send those who are “pre-qualified” to BUD/S.  Additionally, recruiters should be 
held more accountable for recruited personnel who desire to become SEALS.  A 
“recruiter reward incentive” should be extended to recruiters who succeed in getting 
recruits not just to BUD/S, but all the way through the program.  This process could be 
started with a Mini-BUD/S type of program for prospective enlisted BUD/S candidates. 
This strategy would provide NSW with a look at the prospective recruits while, at the 
same time, providing the recruits a preview of NSW to determine if they “fit” into the 
type of work environment associated with the SEAL Teams.   Highly qualified potential 
recruits could be extended an opportunity to be released from their enlisted service 
obligation were they not to make it through BUD/S.  This would lower the cost/benefit 
ratio for highly qualified recruits who may, otherwise, decide not to take the risk of 
failing out of BUD/S if such failure entails serving in the Navy Fleet for the remainder of 
their enlistment. 
Future NSW funding has already been requested to build up the BUD/S pipeline 
with more instructors and facilities in order to push more recruits through the SEAL 
training pipeline.  However, the idea of simply increasing the number of BUD/S 
candidates is not going to solve the NSW enlisted SEAL manning dilemma.  We believe 
that a better screening process should be implemented to get a higher caliber or “more 
qualified” individual into the existing pipeline without significantly increasing the 
number of new candidates checking into BUD/S.  The number of graduating BUD/S 
candidates can, and should, be increased by improving the quality of the input, not 
necessarily increasing the number of inputs.  The historic graduation rate of 25% isn’t an 
NSW requirement, needed in order to retain the quality of SEALS that the community 
desires.  The 25% GR is simply a historic trend at BUD/S; it can be changed without 
watering down the training curriculum.  The key idea in Chapter 2 is that quality 
graduates come from quality recruits.  This proposal would increase SEAL manning 
inventory as well as retention.  Arguably, higher quality recruits will ultimately evolve 
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into higher quality SEALs who will have a positive impact on the type of personnel who 
might, otherwise, not stay in the community.  Ultimately, a higher quality input to the 
NSW community would increase retention in addition to improving the manning level. 
Another retention option may be to try and prolong the average NSW enlisted 
SEAL’s career through improved pay and benefits.  With the exception of FY02 (the post 
9/11 figures), there is a historical retirement rate for Category E enlisted SEALs of 
approximately 60%.  In other words, 60% of the SEALs with over twenty years 
experience are lost every year (Appendix A).  Especially during a time of war, there 
should be a focused effort on reducing the resignation and retirement rate among the 
older and more experienced SEALS.  These experienced operators are critical to helping 
expand the force through critical instruction and mentorship.  Pay and benefits must be 
raised to help create an incentive for this Category of SEAL operators to remain in the 
NSW community.  There are numerous incentive options being explored at the SOCOM 
and NSW level, but 100% of base pay retirement benefits for an operator who stays in the 
NSW community for 30 years may prove to be a worthwhile proposal.  Long term 
retirement improvements may help with the Category E SEALs, but they may not prove 
an adequate motivation for keeping the Category A, B, and C SEALs in the Navy.   
Retirement changes may be the long-term retention solution, but adjusting pay 
and benefits may be the short-term answer.  The pay and benefit problem needs to be 
addressed in light of the more immediate problem of losing less experienced SEALs to 
the world of civilian contractors, such as DynCorp and Blackwater.  The hard truth is that 
there are companies willing to pay enlisted SEALs six times their military salary.    
Although the enlisted paycheck will never be competitive with the PMI salaries, the 
difference between these pays can certainly be reduced in an effort to extend to enlisted 
SEALs a more substantial paycheck.  As a key piece of SOCOM’s WOT arsenal, a 
fractional increase to the paycheck of enlisted operators (not just SEALs) will go a long 
way toward winning the game of retention.  As discussed in Chapter II, the specialty pay 
for enlisted SEALs should be adjusted to the corresponding levels they were at in the late 
1960s.  Simply put, SEAL specialty pay has not kept pace with the significant increases 
in the cost of living over the last three decades. 
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Another aspect of retention which may need to be addressed is the NSW WOT 
deployment strategy.  An assessment of how the majority of enlisted SEALs are being 
employed around the globe illustrates that many deployed SEALs are conducting JCETs.  
Although there are required political and alliance-building concerns even during a time of 
war, there is a valid rationale to reduce, or even eliminate, JCETS from the current NSW 
global agenda.  A solution may lie in the suggestion of putting most of the politically 
insensitive JCETs on hold or assign them to other non-SOF units.  Joint and combined 
evolutions are taking place every day in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In this time of critical 
manning, NSW must look at every operator and how he is being utilized or under-utilized 
as the case may be.  By studying the true SEAL “job requirements” for this war, NSW 
may need to re-think what the core competencies should be in order to fit the current 
environment and threat.  A changed deployment strategy may lead to better retention and 
other long term benefits.   
Increasing the enlisted SEAL inventory will take some time to implement.  
However, NSW needs to make an immediate change to the existing force structure that is 
significant enough to carry out current war time requirements and sustain them during 
peacetime in the future.  Increasing manpower in response to imminent threats, while 
decreasing manpower for diminishing threats, seems to be a historic trend in the US 
military record.  In order to avoid cyclical retention and manning levels, NSW should 
adapt a strategy to sustain an adequate SEAL enlisted force.  NSW needs consistent 
benefits and long-term monetary compensation in order to retain enlisted SEALS for the 
long run.  In order to implement plans as described above, increased DOD funding will 
have to be allocated to NSW. 
To maintain this NSW manning model, the leadership within NSW should keep 
current and accurate data that traces the concerns SEALs consider important.  A new 
NSW Community Climate Survey and Enlisted Exit Survey will be completed shortly 
and made available for review throughout the community.  This tool provides valuable 
insight into how more detailed variables may be used to update the model in order to 
develop it into a complex and detailed analytical tool.  However, administering this 
survey every four years will not allow the NSW community to proactively address 
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manning issues until it is too late to react.  A Community Climate Survey should be 
administered to every enlisted SEAL each year.   
If even one of the conclusions listed above is addressed by SEAL leaders, the 
NSW community will witness a sustainable improvement to the manning and retention 
issues which will continue to be a concern during this WOT.  This war will not disappear 
any time soon, and the wartime requirements for enlisted SEALs will only increase over 
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APPENDIX A.  NAVY VS. ENLISTED SEAL REENLISTMENT 
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APPENDIX B.  INPUT NUMBER OF CANDIDATES REQUIRED 
THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE POSSIBLE RANGE OF 
GRADUATION RATES (0-100%) 
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